








In recent decades the familiar discourse of musicology has been subject to profound upheaval, 
as the discipline has welcomed influences from literary studies, feminism, sociology, and a 
variety of hard sciences, to name just a few. A key moment in this process was the publication 
in 1985 of Joseph Kerman’s Contemplating Music, which launched the movement known as 
New Musicology, among whose leading lights were Ruth Solie, Susan McClary and Philip 
Brett, among others. Each of these has imported into musicology its own discourse, its own 
norms of argumentation, its own conception of what counts as evidence, its own set of values 
– though given that these were themselves contested within each discipline, this process was 
bound to be uncertain and partial. These different discourses do not always live in amity under 
the sheltering umbrella of musicology. On the contrary, one can perceive a tendency among 
some of them to reconfigure and redefine the subject matter of musicology in their own terms, 
a tendency which, if allowed to proceed unchallenged, risks robbing the traditional discipline 
of musicology of its intellectual autonomy.  
 
This paper uncovers this tendency in two influential texts, which arise out of two different sorts 
of discourse. One of them (Cook & Clarke, 2004), asserts the desirability of a hard science 
discourse, the other (Born, 2010) calls for a realignment of musicology along sociological and 
anthropological lines. I argue that both forms of discourse essentially reduce musicology to a 
secondary discipline, granted value only to the extent that it is willing to ape the discourse of 
others, and that the old form of musicology embodied a particular musical form of knowledge 
















What are the values that drive the discipline of musicology nowadays? The question is fraught 
with the same difficulty that attends any enquiry into a field of human creativity, namely that 
the activity is itself the expression of a set of values. Musicians, of whatever kind and from 
whatever culture, are driven to do what they do by a plurality of motivations: economic 
necessity, duty (religious or social), a relish for and interest in the materials of music and the 
enjoyment of the skills required to make them audible, and that peculiar sense of psychic 
compulsion expressed in the phrase 'I make music because I have to.' But alongside these things 
there is a sense that that what they do is also valuable, even necessary. This sense of value tout 
court is the essential adjunct. By this I mean a conception, manifested in concrete observable 
behaviours as much as in 'states of mind', that music and music-making are worthy of immense 
time, effort and communal and individual resources, beyond what is required by the purely 
pragmatic uses of music in ceremonial, entertainment, ritual, etc. It may be objected that this 
conception is otiose, and that any given manifestation of music-making can be accounted for 
pragmatically—in other words, the value of music is precisely equivalent to the degree of its 
utility. But this is to declare the question of value closed and settled, before it has even been 
raised. We have enough evidence of many different kinds to suggest that music-making can 
acquire a value in itself, in other words that it can be, and often is, an intrinsic good.1 
Not every act of music-making falls into that category. It is all too easy to find examples of 
music-making that fall into the opposite category of the narrowly pragmatic, or even cynically 
commercial. How can one distinguish between them?  One might hazard the hypothesis that 
music-making takes on an intrinsic value only when the way in which it is carried out manifests 
other values beyond the purely pragmatic. For example, in the Western art tradition, the value 
of the music has often been bound up with its degree of professionalism, (though 'inspired 
amateurism' has at times been valued more highly), and in other cultures there are other, very 
different criteria of 'good performance.' But this is far from being the only criterion. To mention 
one other, it is also (in certain circumstances, at certain periods of history) bound up with the 
degree of originality it manifests, or to put it in another way, how far it tests the limits of a 
convention or genre. At other periods, such as in seventeenth-century Europe, the value of 
music has been judged by the criteria of seemliness or appropriateness.   
So within a practice there may well be competing value-systems, which are reconciled 
not at the level of conceptual thinking but of practice. Practice can make ordered and 
meaningful in reality what at the conceptual level seems incoherent.  The same plurality can 
be heard and felt in that all-important (but much contested) category of the Western tradition, 
the work.2  Over time this became the locus of a new value: the supreme value of the work qua 
work. This may indeed have been monolithic, and wielded as a weapon to defeat rival sources 
 
1 For an informative discussion of the issues see Noah Lemos, Intrinsic Value (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
2 The work-concept in Western classical music was famously anatomised in Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary 
Museum of Musical Works (Oxford: OUP, 2d rev. edition 2008), a book which has spawned a large critical 
literature. Notable examples are Michael Talbot, ed., The Musical Work: Reality or Invention? (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2000), Gavin Steingo, "The Musical Work Reconsidered, in Hindsight," in Current 
Musicology 97 (2014), pp. 81-112.  
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of value (the spontaneity of improvisation, for example), as was shown by the increasing 
tendency throughout the 19th century for composers to encroach on the soloist’s long-standing 
freedom to invent his/her own cadenzas.3 But it doesn’t follow that the work itself embodies, 
at the material level, a singular conception of value. A work can embody tensions within itself, 
between different values. An example: a work may manifest a high degree of professional 
finish, but be lacking in the accepted markers of originality, or vice versa. Another example: a 
work may make explicit or at least identifiable allusions to musical materials or structural 
processes well-established in existing traditions, but at the same time demonstrate no palpable 
characteristics which would distinguish it from a work which could have been composed in an 
earlier era. The accepted term for this sort of work is 'pastiche,' a term whose derogatory 
implications are a reminder that when a work does embody tensions between different values, 
one of those values tends to triumph. We admire the skill of the pastiche, but many of us despise 
its derivative qualities more.  
The work, and the expressive act that makes it real, is, in short, a field of tensions, 
expressed at several ontological levels: motivation, causation, expressive affect. Despite its 
appearance of monolithic fixity, a work becomes plural the moment it enters the world of 
performance, as it will inevitably he heard in different ways by different audiences. To that 
plurality is added gradual decay, until the work is reduced to shadow or ruin by the slow 
attrition of time. Love is what rescues it from dissolution, and allows us to fix it if only 
momentarily as an object of experience in performance, and of incarnated meaning in the form 
of critical, verbal explication. Love may seem a curious concept to introduce into an essay on 
an academic discipline, but it will be central to the argument.  
This leads us to the question at the heart of this essay, namely: should musicology share 
in the values of the music it is studying? To put it more strongly, should musicologists be 
motivated by a love for the thing studied?4 The answer increasingly is 'no,' as we shall see, and 
this 'no' could be seen as a sign of the powerful influence of sociology on contemporary 
musicology. It was after all one of the founding fathers of modern sociology Max Weber who 
put forward the notion that fact and value should be kept strictly separate, in an effort to create 
a discipline that would be Werturteilsfreiheit (free of value judgements).5 That attitude is 
faithfully maintained in the work of one notable sociologist of music, as we shall see. However, 
the question of whether musicology can be 'value-free' as if it were a species of sociology is 
actually one of the questions at issue. So we cannot assume the truth or even the utility of the 
Werturteilsfreiheit ideal at the outset. In any case, in the early decades of musicology the 
answer to the question of whether the discipline should share in the values of the music it was 
investigating was an unequivocal 'yes,' and I will argue that without that 'yes,' the ostensible 
subject of study becomes a chimera, always threatening to vanish from our gaze. 
2. The Old Musicology 
 
3 Eva Badura-Skoda, Andrew V. Jones, and William Drabkin. "Cadenza," in Grove Music Online (2001) 
(https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-
9781561592630-e-0000043023.), accessed January 3, 2021.  
4 Nicholas Cook would say emphatically not; see his "On Qualifying Relativism," in Musica Scientiae, Vol 5, 
No. 2 (September 2001), pp. 167-189.  
5 Max Weber, Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and eds. Edward A. Shils and 
Henry A. (Finch, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949). 
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In time, this internalising of the values of art music was shown in the most obvious way, by the 
choice of subject matter. It is true that the founders of the discipline of musicology envisaged 
that the whole of music would be its subject-matter – it was to be Vergleichende 
Musikwissenschaft. But though some pioneering work was done in the study of non-Western 
musics, the focus for of the discipline was overwhelmingly on Western art music.6  This is not 
the place to rehearse the immense consequences for the discipline of that choice. However, 
there is one aspect of that focus which is insufficiently remarked on. Just as art music itself was 
a conjunction of practices which can be separately studied and mastered, each carrying a set of 
values which can be in a degree of tension with the others, so musicology was itself a bringing 
together of a number of disparate practices, each with its own standards of excellence, its own 
skill-sets, its own 'culture,' one could say. To mention just a few in Adler’s formulation, there 
were palaeography, acoustics, organology and diplomatics.  
Recently more tools have been added to the musicologist’s armoury, such as analysis, 
a field pioneered by such thinkers as Hugo Riemann, Heinrich Schenker and Rudolph Reti.7 
Just as it was at the level of practice that a unity was forged out of competing values in the art 
of art music, so in musicology it was at the level of the total practice that a unity was forged 
out of this apparently incoherent yoking together of sub-disciplines with no common 
conceptual root. In that respect, the discipline internalised the essential, irreducible pluralism 
in the values of the thing studied, not merely by studying that plurality of things that embodied 
Western art music’s value-set, but by enacting it, through its own plurality. 
What grounded the plurality was a deeply felt engagement with the subject matter, 
mediated in part through a degree of practical engagement with its materials. This accounts for 
a feature of the university and conservatoire curricula of ' old musicology, ' which the advocates 
of more recent forms of musicology find embarrassing, namely the incorporation of significant 
elements of practice.  Undergraduates were expected to master harmony and counterpoint, 
which included such demanding skills as composing a five-part mass in the style of Palestrina, 
or sight-reading a Strauss opera, or harmonising a chorale. These skills are disdained nowadays 
by many new musicologists as useful only to church organists or repetiteurs in opera 
companies.  
What that view overlooks is that gaining even a modest proficiency in these skills brings 
in the vital element of embodied knowledge, for which discursive knowledge can never be a 
complete substitute. The basic idea of embodied knowledge, which is that we 'know more than 
we can tell,'8 goes hand-in-hand with the notion that to acquire it, one has to commit, if only 
 
6 Musicology might from the outset have taken the whole of music as its subject matter, had the lead of the 
French/Belgian 19th century school of musicology been followed (see François-Joseph Fétis, Histoire de la 
Musique, 1869-1875). In fact, the discipline followed the lead of Guido Adler in his "Umfang, Methode und 
Ziel der Musikwissenschaft" in Vierteljahrsschrift für Musikwissenschaft 1 (1885), pp. 5-20. His vision for the 
discipline hides a bias towards Western art music under an appearance of a systematic investigation of the entire 
realm of music, a bias which was perpetuated in the subsequent development of the discipline for at least a 
century. The existence of a separate discipline called ethnomusicology since the 1950s is sufficient evidence of 
this.  
7 Hugo Riemann, System der musikalischen Rhythmik und Metrik (Leipzig, 1903), Heinrich Schenker, Fünf 
Urlinie-Tafeln (Vienna, 1932); rev. 2/1969 by F. Salzer as Five Graphic Music Analyses, Rudolph Réti The 
Thematic Process in Music (New York, 1951). 
8 To use the well-known formulation of Michael Polanyi in his The Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1966), p. 4. 
5 
 
temporarily, to a particular stance towards the world.9 One cannot attempt to 'hypothetically' 
play a piano, or a West African thumb-piano  – one has to commit oneself to making a genuine 
attempt to play the instrument, in order to succeed in playing it (or indeed to fail to play it). 
Only then will we gain the embodied form of knowledge that a musical instrument can give us 
(along with many other kinds).10 Music, more than most other disciplines, shows how the act 
of commitment is an indispensable pre-condition for gaining a certain kind of knowledge.  
Still, the skill-set taught in music faculties in the bad old days was indeed narrow, which 
is why it was enlarged over the decades, to include such things as the study of performance as 
well as scores, atonal harmony, electronic music, studio production and (more recently) music 
software, and of course the broadening of the curriculum to take in popular and non-Western 
musics. The ostensible motive for this enlargement was to demonstrate that university music 
courses were still 'relevant.' But the fact that these new skills took their place alongside the old 
ones, only partially displacing them, and the fact that they sat side-by-side in the curriculum 
with courses bearing such names as 'Understanding Music History'11 perhaps shows something 
else; that the academics and practitioners who shaped these courses adhered to the belief that a 
set of practices can incarnate a set of values or – to put it more strongly – that the values inherent 
in a musical culture can only be understood by being first internalised and then asserted, 
through a set of practices. 
However, the example I have given reveals that this assertion is becoming more and 
more a forlorn hope. Fifty years ago, the patchwork of disciplines could make sense. To pass 
from the study of Frescobaldi’s notation, and thence to his harmonic practice, and thence to an 
unravelling of the cultural background to his organ music, and finally to playing it at the organ, 
is a coherent enterprise (as is a course connecting the history, analysis, and creation of 
electronic music). The forms of approach to the materials are mutually supporting. Fast forward 
to today, and we encounter curious clashes which are far from mutually supporting. To pass 
from an introductory course in the morning on 'Music and the Brain' to a course on Renaissance 
counterpoint or studio production or jazz improvisation in the afternoon is to risk a state of 
profound confusion. There is no affinity at the level of concept or practice between these 
activities. What binds them together? 'Music', of course, but it is striking that just as the concept 
music is being called on to work harder than ever, to hold together these increasingly disparate 
areas of knowledge and practice, it is being eviscerated from within. Intellectual history is full 
of ironies. 
3. From Practice to Criticism 
It was this situation, in statu nascendi, that prompted Joseph Kerman to write his anxious 
survey of musicology entitled Contemplating Music.12 Kerman could see that the discipline he 
had been trained in was losing its coherence. Its various sub-disciplines were in danger of 
 
9 The literature on embodied knowledge is now vast. Key texts are George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
Metaphors we Live By (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), Andy Clarke, Being There: Putting Mind, 
Body and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). For a measured view of the more extreme 
claims of embodied cognition, see Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, "Why the Mind is Still in the Head," in 
Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 78-95. 
10 For an example of this, see David Sudnow, Ways of the Hand, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1993). 
11 Compulsory first-year module for BMus students at Newcastle University 2019-20 
https://www.ncl.ac.uk/undergraduate/degrees/w304/#d.en.296264 accessed 27 September 2019  
12 Known in the UK as ‘‘Musicology’. Joseph Kerman, Musicology (London: Fontana Press, 1986). 
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becoming so elaborate, so sealed off in their own area of technical expertise, that they would 
soon lose touch with each other. Kerman instanced analysis as an example of a sub-discipline 
that was increasingly locked up within its own discourse, its findings shrouded in such a 
technically forbidding jargon as to be inaccessible to anyone but analysts. 
By this date (Kerman’s book was published in 1985) the idea that musicology might 
derive part of its coherence from a set of practical skills, which all its practitioners would share 
at some level, was already starting to look dated. The suggestion that musicology should 
properly be regarded as a branch of ethnomusicology (a term whose definition, scope and 
methods were and remain contentious) was already in the air,13 and if that suggestion were 
generally accepted, what possible use would a grounding in H & C have? Would it in fact not 
prove to be a liability, giving a sense of being in grounded in 'nature' to ways of thinking about 
musical material that were in fact local and contingent and very far from natural?  
Although Kerman never puts it in this way, his book could be seen as an attempt to 
provide a substitute for the old grounding in practice. That substitute was criticism, the act of 
critical appreciation and judgement that would bring together the scattered insights of the 
analysts, historians, organologists and so on. This unifying act of criticism presupposed a deep 
personal engagement with the music under discussion, an engagement which was even then 
thought to be a failure of scholarly decorum. Kerman noted the tendency among some of his 
colleagues to separate off their musical insights and passions from their scholarly work. 'I 
believe this is a great mistake,' he asserted stoutly. 'Musicologists should exert themselves 
towards fusion, not separation. When the study of music history loses touch with the aesthetic 
core of music, which is the subject matter of criticism, it can only too easily degenerate into a 
shallow exercise. At the same time, I also believe that the most solid basis for criticism is 
history, rather than music theory or ethnomusicology…. What I uphold and try to practise is a 
kind of musicology oriented towards criticism, a kind of criticism oriented towards history.' 14 
It is significant that Kerman opts for history as the basis of his interpretative form of 
musicology. Presumably he means that history of which the musical work forms a part, which 
is by and large an Occidental history. This would ensure that the two discourses (of criticism 
as applied to the work, and the history that supplies the grounding) are mutually supportive, 
avoiding on the one hand the analytical wastes of theory, and the relativizing gaze of 
ethnomusicology. No wonder Kerman’s project for musicology now seems so forlorn. It is 
 
13 The ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl was a pioneer in the application of the ethnomusicological perspective to 
Western music, in e.g. "A Technique of Ethnomusicology Applied to Western Culture (Comments on Merriam, 
"Purposes of Ethnomusicology"’)," in Ethnomusicology, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1963), pp. 221-4. By the early 21st 
century the view that this was a necessary and inevitable development, long overdue, was widespread, as 
reflected in the title of Nicholas Cook’s article "We Are All (Ethno)musicologists Now," in Henry Stobart, ed., 
The New (Ethno)musicologies (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008), pp. 48-67. [Other key texts in the history 
of this process: Robert Faulkner, "Orchestra Interaction: Some Features of Communication and Authority in an 
Artistic Organization," in Sociological Quarterly 14 (1973), pp. 147-57; Catherine M. Cameron, "Dialectics in 
the Arts: Composer Ideology and Culture Change" (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, IL, 1982). Modified version published as Dialectics in the Arts: The Rise of Experimentalism in 
American Music (Westport, CO, and London: Praeger, 1996); Klaus Wachsmann, "Applying 
Ethnomusicological Methods to Western Art Music," in World of Music 23 (1981), pp. 74-86; Christopher 
Small, "Performance as Ritual: Sketch for an Enquiry into the Nature of a Symphony Concert," in Avron Levine 
White, ed., Lost in Music: Culture, Style, and the Musical Event (London: Routledge, 1987), pp. 6-32; Henry 
Kingsbury, Music, Talent, & Performance: A Conservatory Cultural System (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1988)]. 
14 Kerman, op. cit., pp. 18-9. 
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politically unacceptable, on two levels. It reaffirms the importance of the work, an Occidental 
concept if there ever was one, and it privileges the Occidental history which creates the 
meaningful context for interpreting those works.  
Kerman’s was the most recent attempt to suggest an overall stance or orientation for 
the discipline of musicology, which is still focused on one particular tradition of music-making. 
It’s fair to assume it will be the last. These days, musicologists eschew any grand ambitions of 
that kind. It is assumed that music (considered globally rather than through one tradition, an 
attitude which is now a given) is plural in its essence, a process with many modalities of 
existence, each of which is amenable to a different form of investigation, carried out in its own 
special discourse. This is profoundly different to the old dispensation, where the approaches to 
music were indeed many, but the thing studied was thought of as possessing the nature of a 
singularity, revealed – if only momentarily – in an act of imaginative engagement, performative 
or critical. It was in truth that thing named 'music', which when considered dispassionately 
'from the outside' revealed itself partially, in many facets, each of which had to be approached 
in a different way.   
This may be admirably democratic, but two problems arise, one epistemological, one 
political. The epistemological one is that, in a field where numerous mutually untranslatable 
discourses flourish, the idea that there is nevertheless something called 'music,' of which all 
these different discourses are the subject, starts to seem incoherent. How can we know there is 
something called 'music' existing prior to the various discourses, which so to speak underlies 
and unites them? There is no longer an unquestionable grounding of the discipline that stands 
outside any of the discourses that make it up – the 'absolute presupposition,' to borrow 
Collingwood’s phrase15– and such things are now definitely out of favour.  
The political problem is that, intellectual life being what it is, the ideal democracy of 
the discourses cannot be the truth of the situation. In the fight for academic prestige and 
funding, some discourses will always turn out to be more favoured than others. If the field of 
study has already been so disposed as to render the actual music invisible, then music will be 
among the losers, in that battle for existence in the academy. To survive it will need to hitch its 
wagon to a stronger discipline, more able to withstand the rough-and-tumble of academic life, 
and that creates the problem that, in allying itself to a politically more attractive discipline, 
musicology will end up being swallowed by it. There will be no shortage of contenders to fill 
that space in musicology that was once filled by a shared practice, through which a set of values 
was manifested.  
 
4. The claims of Empirical Musicology 
We see one of the most powerful contenders in that branch of musicology known as 'empirical 
musicology.' Here the guiding paradigm is the scientific one, and no form of discourse has so 
much prestige and academic clout as this. So one should not be surprised to see a tendency 
within empirical musicology for the scientific form of discourse to assert its dominance over 
 
15 R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (1940; revised ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998). 
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others. One can see this it very clearly in the tendency’s foundational text, Empirical 
Musicology: Aims, Methods, Prospects (2004), edited by Eric Clarke and Nicholas Cook.16 
The authors begin by questioning the findings of old musicology, which they admit was 
empirical at the most general level of description, but which—they say—tended to transfer 
habits of large risky generalisation learned in data-poor fields to data-rich ones. 'There may be 
many musicological certainties that would not survive a systematic engagement with the 
available data,'17 they declare. The constant reiteration of the term 'data' carries the mind willy-
nilly towards the new more favoured form of discourse, one where 'data' counts for more than 
any other source of knowledge. Using that term presupposes that musicology derives its 
knowledge from data, but that is a presupposition that could be questioned. It could be argued 
that in many cases the units of knowledge of musicology – the facts it deals in – are essentially 
qualitative, mediated in some way by an act of interpretation.  
This opening gambit is typical of the way statements that once belonged to an 
interpretative discourse are briskly re-described in the language of science. There is another on 
the previous page, where the authors characterise '…the trial-and-error process by which 
music-analytical interpretations develop, with observation leading to interpretation and 
interpretation in turn guiding observation' as 'a model of close, empirically regulated reading.'18 
There is something intuitively odd about this formulation. Perhaps this is how the authors feel 
music-analytical interpretations really ought to develop, but the model seems implausible when 
applied to any notable musical-analytical interpretations that actually exist. It’s hard to see any 
evidence of the 'trial-and-error' method in Lawrence Dreyfus’s explication of Bach’s rhetorical 
view of music,19 or Susan McClary’s interpretations of 17th-century Italian madrigals20 – not 
to mention Donald Tovey’s explication of Beethoven’s string quartets.21 
These examples remind us – if we need reminding – that musical-analytical 
interpretations are an untidy mix of different sorts of evidence and different styles of reasoning, 
which cannot be assimilated to an empirical method, however generously that term is 
interpreted. They carry conviction by their power to give explanatory coherence to a range of 
phenomena, not by being proved or disproved by the patient enumeration of thousands of 
confirming or disconfirming instances, each of whose status as such will in any case remain 
arguable. 
A humanistic interpretation invites assent for its explanatory power, particularly if it 
proves that the interpretation can be fruitfully applied to new bodies of evidence.  But Cook 
and Clarke want to go further. They want the predictive power of a proper scientific theory, 
and suggest it could have such a power, in their discussion of Marion Guck’s thought 
experiment about a key harmonic move in the 2nd movement of Mozart’s G Minor Symphony 
K 550. The move hinges on a surprising intrusion of a Cb, which first appears in bar 2, and 
then more strikingly at bar 53, where it launches a startling new harmonic trajectory. They tell 
 
16 Erik Clarke and Nicholas Cook, eds., Empirical Musicology Aims, Methods, Prospects (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2004), p. 4. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 3. 
19 Lawrence Dreyfus, Bach and the Patterns of Invention (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1996). 
20 Susan McClary, Desire and Pleasure in Seventeenth-Century Music (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2012).  
21 Donald Tovey, Essays in Music Analysis: Chamber Music, ed. H.J Foss (Oxford: OUP 1944, new ed., 1966). 
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us that Guck 'likens the Cb to an ‘indomitable immigrant,' 'conspicuously foreign to the tonal 
environment of the movements, but eventually assimilated within it and even ultimately serving 
to transform it…'22 They conclude that Guck 'describes a way in which she can hear the music, 
and invites her reader to share her experience.' 
By saying this the authors of Empirical Musicology acknowledge what is obvious to 
the reader, namely that Guck’s suggestion is an admirable example of good old-fashioned 
criticism, carried out with enormous skill and poetic suggestiveness. But they want to move us 
on from that view. So they re-describe it as 'a discovery procedure resulting in a replication of 
experience,' which could lead to a measure of 'intersubjective agreement.'23 In the space of a 
few lines we have been transported into an entirely different discourse, one with an appealingly 
scientific ring, which will lend Guck’s statement an entirely different form of authority. The 
key word is 'replication,' but it’s surely the wrong word in this context, because every listener 
will experience that 'immigrant' Cb in a different way. The experience of hearing and 
understanding such a complex phenomenon as a harmonically vagrant note requires a 
sophisticated grasp of tonal grammar and a particular 'cultural competence.' Given that every 
listener’s musical experience and 'competence' varies, there’s no way such a complex cognitive 
operation could be 'replicated.' If it could be, the experience of hearing Mozart’s G minor 
symphony would never change, and the history of music reception would grind to a halt.  It 
should be said that Guck herself has an old-fashioned positivist view of her craft, as befits a 
disciple of Milton Babbitt, and so slips sometimes into scientistic-speak herself – as when she 
declares 'if your hearing matches mine, my description ... provides a means, however implicit, 
to codify it'24 A code in information theory is a way of specifying an algorithmic relationship 
between the members of one set of symbols and a set of 'referents,' or another set of symbols. 
It is therefore essentially mechanical. What Guck offers is an imaginative re-hearing of a piece 
of music, which by its nature can never be reduced to a code. This suggests that the empirical-
scientific strain in musicology today has its ancestry in positivist ways of thinking of the mid 
20th-century—which these days we are sternly advised to eschew. Another irony of intellectual 
history!  
The confusion of discourses revealed in this passage is a problem everywhere in 
musicology, which is now a babble of competing schemes of explanation and interpretation. 
To which some might retort—what’s new? Did I not begin by asserting that musicology has 
always been a babble of discourses, to honour the hybrid nature of music itself, which is at 
once a cultural artefact, a form of social interaction, and a conceptual apparatus with elaborate 
formal properties? Indeed I did; the essential difference with respect to the situation today is 
the erosion of the bedrock that once supported that plurality. It is this that makes musicology’s 
current predicament new and dangerous. That erosion has created a power vacuum, which 
explains why some of the discourses in the babble are not content to live alongside the others. 
They want to rule the roost, and—as already pointed out—their power is as much political as 
intellectual. The tendency of the scientific discourse to re-describe the humanistic one in its 
own terms is one example, but this at least leaves the musical object (whether conceived as text 
 
22 Clark and Cook, op. cit., p. 5. 
23 ibid., p. 5. 
24 Marion Guck "Rehabilitating the Incorrigible," in Anthony Pople, ed., Theory, Analysis and Meaning in 
Music, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 64. 
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or the act that renders the text into sound, or performance tout court) intact, as an entity to be 
responded too, criticised, interpreted, analysed, or whatever. 
 
6. The claims of sociology 
More insidious is the attempt to reconceive musicology as a species of sociology. This threatens 
to dissolve the musical realm into something else; a set of social actions together with their 
associated meanings.  First comes the switch of attention away from musical objects to musical 
performances, the so-called 'performative turn' Nicholas Cook describes the turn well in his 
essay 'Between Process and Product.'25 He sums up the shift of focus this turn entails as follows: 
…instead of seeing musical works as texts within which social structures are encoded we see them as 
scripts in response to which social relationships are enacted: the object of analysis is now present and self-
evident in the interaction between performers and in the acoustic trace that they leave.26 
 
For anthropologist Georgina Born this doesn’t go far enough. In her 2010 essay 'For a 
Relational Musicology: Music and Interdisciplinarity, Beyond the Practice Turn' she advocates 
a more thorough-going encounter between musicology and the many intellectual resources so 
far untapped in sociology and anthropology. This will not be, cannot be, a simple purloining 
of the insights of one discipline by another. Rather, what is needed is something she admits 
will be difficult for many to accept – '…the radical stance of the agonistic-antagonistic mode, 
which suggests that addressing music as immanently social and cultural requires a break – an 
epistemological shift in our understanding of all musics, an approach that is irreducible to the 
addition of the antecedent (sub)disciplines, since all will be changed in the process.'27 
It’s an intoxicating prospect, but once the delirium has worn off, hard questions present 
themselves. One is the nature of the contribution that 'old' or even New Musicology could make 
in this Grand Concert of the disciplines. Born tries to reassure worried musicologists, by 
asserting that music has plenty to offer. She declares that 'anthropology, sociology and history 
stand as much to be transformed by an orientation towards music and music’s mediation of 
social, cultural and temporal processes as do the music disciplines through growing exchanges 
with the social sciences and history.'28  But note the asymmetry of this relationship. She names 
three disciplines which stand to be transformed by an encounter, not with the discipline of 
musicology, but with music – music as already reconceived in the sociological and 
anthropological ways Born is advocating in her essay.  
It’s a tiny slippage, one that could pass un-noticed, but it is actually very revealing. The 
skill set of musicology, and the forms of embodied, institutionalised knowledge that it has built 
over the generations, would stand in the way of this conceptual realignment. So they would 
surely be an early casualty of it (ironically enough, a striking piece of evidence for this lies in 
 
25 Nicholas Cook, "Between Process and Product: Music and/as Performance," in Music Theory Online, Vol 7 
No. 2 (April 2000), www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.01.7.2/mto.01.7.2.cook.html, accessed October 10, 2019. 
26 Ibid., p. 9. 
27 Georgina Born, "For a Relational Musicology; Music and Interdisciplinarity, Beyond the Practice Turn," 
Journal of the Royal Musical Association, Vol. 135, No. 2 (2010), pp. 205-243. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02690403.2010.506265 
28 Ibid., p 23. 
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Born’s well-known study of IRCAM, whose chief flaw is its lack of a solid grounding in the 
musical substance of the work undertaken in the institution she criticises).29 The physical 
manifestation of this knowledge, in such things as scholarly editions, libraries and faculties of 
music, practice rooms, auditoria and studios may also be under threat in a world of ‘relational 
musicology’ that has no use for them.30 There is a further aspect, one which brings us to the 
nub of this essay. This is what one might call the disposition or motivation of the practitioner. 
People who become musicologists have in the past done so because they have an enormous 
love for music per se, a love which in their case happens to express itself through intellectual 
curiosity rather performing or composing, though they may have these motivations too (the 
fact that traditional definitions of musicology place the discipline alongside these two activities 
in a triumvirate nicely illustrates the point that they have a common root).31  
That much could be said of any discipline. Chemists have a fascination for chemistry, 
lawyers for the law. What makes musicology different (though perhaps not unique) is the 
correlative emotion of pleasure. Musicologists very commonly take pleasure in musical 
patterns, at least some of them. The aspect of fascination or curiosity has a vitally instrumental 
function; without it the business of enquiry could hardly begin. The second motivation, that of 
pleasure, is more problematic, because it seems on the face of it to be at best dispensable, and 
at worse seriously misleading. It bestows a value on the object of study, without stopping to 
justify or even explicate that value. When it comes to musicology, we cannot decide what to 
do about pleasure. Kerman’s stout defence of it, referred to above, had its defenders even 
among the New Musicologists. One of that tendency’s leading lights, Lawrence Kramer, 
declared that 'the last thing a post-modernist musicology wants to be is a neo-Puritanism that 
offers to show its love for music by ceasing to enjoy it.'32 In a debate with Gary Tomlinson in 
Current Musicology Kramer acknowledged the post-modernist imperative to treat musical 
works as 'worldly' through and through. At the same time he defended the critical approach 
advocated by Kerman, reminding us that 'we cannot understand music "in context," thick or 
otherwise, if we have no means of representing concretely what the music does as utterance,' 
and declared that close reading is important in order to 'trace out the interrelations of musical 
pleasure, musical form and ideology. Not to pursue that possibility is tantamount to 
denying…the two cardinal historically grounded truths, that music (or art) is meaningful and 
music (or art) gives pleasure.'33 Gary Tomlinson, in his response to Kramer’s essay, chides the 
author for offering 'a musicology still conceived as a means to illuminate our own aesthetic 
experiences,' and urges us to 'dredge up our usual impassioned musical involvements from the 
 
29 Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-
Garde. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1995). See the review by Richard Hermann, 
"Reflexive Postmodern Anthropology meets Musical "Modernism"," in Music Theory Online, Vol. 3, No. 5, 
https://mtosmt.org/issues/mto.97.3.5/mto.97.3.5.hermann.html,  accessed October 11, 2019 
30 It’s worth pointing out that Nicholas Cook has proposed a different conception of relational musicology 
in"Anatomy of the Encounter: Intercultural Analysis as Relational Musicology," in  Stan Hawkins, ed., Critical 
Musicological Reflections: Essays in Honour of Derek B. Scott (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 193-208. 
31 E.g Frank Ll. Harrison in his essay "American Musicology and the European Tradition" declares that 
'Traditionally the function of musicology has been in the first place to contribute to the fostering of composition 
and performance by adding to the sum of knowledge about music.' In Frank Ll Harrison, Mantle Hood and 
Claude V Palisca, eds., Musicology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 7. 
32 Lawrence Kramer, "The Musicology of the Future," in Repercussions, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1992), p. 9. 
33  Lawrence Kramer, "Music Criticism and the Post-Modernism: In Contrary Motion with Gary Tomlinson," in 
Current Musicology 53 (1993), p. 31 
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hidden realm of untouchable premise they tend to inhabit, and …make them a dynamic force 
– to be reckoned with, challenged, rejected, indulged in, whatever – within our study.'34  
In other words, pleasure cannot be taken as a measure of interest or value, in and of 
itself. That would be to 'valorise one’s aesthetic preferences,' something about which Born 
takes a more negative view. 'I am always struck,' she says, 'by the way colleagues in film studies 
will study only films that they intend to valorise aesthetically or politically.'35 For her this is 
emphatically the wrong way round, and she has no hesitation in declaring anthropology’s and 
sociology’s stance on this issue to be ethically superior as well as epistemologically more 
fruitful:  'Anthropology and sociology—in their initial suspension of questions of value, in 
researching the nature and the differentiation of value judgments, the existence of local 
contestations and controversies over value in any culture, and in the possibility of an eventual 
return, after all this, to address value anew—in all this, I suggest, anthropology and sociology 
inhabit a less idealist and parochial, more informed and subtler epistemological universe, one 
that is emphatically non-relativist while being undergirded by value pluralism.'36 
Here—if one can untangle the gnarled prose—Born reveals the nub of her project; to 
dethrone the value-system 'old' musicology shares with the other 'old' humanities, and install a 
new one, taken from sociology and anthropology. Should we follow her, agree that 
musicology’s unthinking 'valorisation' of its subject-matter was always reprehensible, and 
admit that finally the truth is out?  
Perhaps it is not so simple. That puzzling final phrase, with its assertion that value 
pluralism is 'emphatically non-relativist,' taken together with the reference to a mysterious 
'return' to 'address value anew'—a 'return' which all the previous work of relativisation has 
surely rendered deeply problematic—should give one pause. They suggest at the very least that 
the question of value in the sociological enterprise is a difficult one, fraught with potential 
antinomies and pitfalls. What of the sociologist’s commitment to his/her own set of values, 
above all the notion that the pursuit of truth is an absolute good, even though the truths revealed 
in any particular sociological enterprise will only be local and temporary? (If the sociologist is 
sceptical of the very idea of truth, taking the view that truth is only what is 'true-for-me,' or true 
within a certain discourse, that is still a commitment). Is this over-arching value to be put in 
inverted commas, along with the value-systems encountered in the social structures being 
examined, or does it somehow survive the sociologist’s own relativizing gaze? If it does 
survive, it raises an interesting and challenging thought; that the sociological and 
anthropological enterprises are animated and guided by values which are not themselves 
explicable within the terms of the discipline itself. The pursuit of truth is not, ultimately, a 
value that can be subjected to a sociological explanation. It lies outside the purview of any 
particular sociological enterprise; it is a given, without which the whole enterprise would 
dissolve into a paralysed scepticism.   
Musicology too has (or had) its given value, which lies outside any particular musical 
practice under observation, and is not explicable within it. It is the rock on which the enterprise 
is built, namely the musicologist’s passion for music, embodied – as it must be – within one 
 
34 Gary Tomlinson, "Musical Pasts and Postmodern Musicologies: A Response to Lawrence Kramer," in 
Current Musicology 53 (1993), p. 24 
35 Born, op. cit., p. 217. 
36 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 
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particular cultural manifestation, but not totally explicable within it, and certainly not forever 
limited to it.  This is the over-arching truth to which he or she clings – the conviction that music 
per se exists, and that it has value by virtue of that independent existence. (It should be clear 
by now what I mean by music per se: it is that form of cultural activity which creates forms of 
ordered sound, whose sounding qualities and formal properties are a form of intrinsic interest, 
beyond any social or other function they may serve)37. It is a passion that serves the knowledge-
gaining ambitions of musicology, just as surely as the sociologists’ commitment to the notion 
of truth, or at least to following a particular knowledge-gaining method serves the 
epistemological ambitions of sociology. Without the promptings of pleasure and appetite and 
passion, the work of musicology cannot even begin; but it does not mean we have to rest content 
with their deliverances. 
Charles Rosen discusses this problem with that mixture of facetiousness and level-
headed reasonableness that so exasperates the New Musicologists. He quotes Gary 
Tomlinson’s observation that ethnomusicologists (of the old kind) tended to transfer 'onto the 
musics they study precisely the western presumptions – of internalism, formalism, 
aestheticism, transcendentalism – that we need to question.'38  'This transference does sound 
very wicked,' agrees Rosen, 'but of course the ethnomusicologist properly starts by trying to 
enjoy the music he is studying, relating it to the music he already knows, and he gradually 
widens his experience and loses his deplorable prejudices as he becomes more deeply involved 
with his field.'39  
To declare, at the outset, that this self-enlightenment is impossible, and that to begin 
with a set of 'deplorable prejudices' means to be forever enslaved by them, is unwarranted 
pessimism. In any field in which aesthetics is involved, film studies as much as music, not to 
make use of one’s passions is epistemologically debilitating – more than that, it is a denial of 
the essential self which in the long run can only be damaging to the researcher, and therefore 
to the work itself. One even wonders whether psychologically it is a sustainable option for a 
career, to be constantly putting one’s appetites and preferences in inverted commas. It would 
be less painful to leave the field altogether, or move to a different part of sociology where 
questions of aesthetics do not arise.  To quote Rosen again, 'without a passionate involvement 
in a particular form of music, an involvement largely unquestioned and unchallenged, the field 
of musicology will shortly become uninhabited.'40  
Under the new dispensation, this would no longer be true. The field of musicology 
would be densely habited with sociologists and anthropologists. That being the case, 
knowledge of and practical competence in handling the materials of music (however 
conceived) will no longer be relevant. On the contrary, not to be well-versed in solfeggio will 
become a positive advantage, as it will reduce the danger that these new 'musicologists' (for 
once the scare quotes seem unavoidable) might apply the mind-set and values of this 
knowledge and skill set to the music they are studying. Musicology departments will over time 
become increasingly staffed by 'analphabetics,' well versed in the theories of Bourdieu and 
 
37 For an elegant conceptual definition of music per se, see Jerrold Levinson, "On the Concept of Music," in 
Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 267–278.  
38 Tomlinson, op. cit., p. 24. 
39 Charles Rosen, "The New Musicology," in Critical Entertainments: Music Old and New, (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 270. 
40 Rosen, op.cit., p. 272. 
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Foucault but unable to say what counterpoint is, or to spell a G major chord, or hear the 
heterophony in a Balkan folk song.  
 
 
7. Musicology in the post-disciplinary academy  
These are the issues (some of them at least) raised by Born’s somewhat scanty consideration 
of 'old' musicology, at the local level of the discipline itself, in her essay on 'relational 
musicology.' Then there is the global issue of disciplines in general, and how they are to be 
surmounted in the post-disciplinary universe that beckons. The transformation of musicology 
she says 'cannot be confined to the conversation between the music subdisciplines. Instead, 
they require us to look outside, beyond the archipelago, to the key adjacent disciplines – the 
next-nearest knowledge continents – that lie beyond musicology; that is, to the sciences of the 
cultural, social and temporal, which is to say, anthropology, sociology and history.'   
In making her plea for musicology to become merely part of a congeries of disciplines, 
Born could be seen to be musicology’s saviour. To flourish in the academy any discipline has 
to join the great interdisciplinary adventure, given that—to quote Julie Thompson Klein—
interdisciplinarity has become 'ubiquitous, the "mantra du jour" in discussion of American 
higher education' (and not just American).41 Disciplines are held by many to be relics of a 
bygone era, unfit for the modern era of 'post-modern knowledge.'42 On all sides one hears calls 
for the 'post-disciplinary university.' As the Introduction to the Oxford Handbook of 
Interdisciplinarity puts it, 'attempts to understand the world or any part of it need to be inter- 
and transdisciplinary in nature – even if this means that we lose the comfort of disciplinary 
guarantees of expertise.'43  
 Given all this one cannot avoid the thought that in making her bid for relational 
musicology at precisely this moment, Born has demonstrated that her proposed new discipline 
is as much a product of political forces as intellectual ones. Relational Musicology would after 
all be the interdisciplinary discipline par excellence, calling on not just the sub-disciplines of 
popular music studies, practice studies, feminist music theory and ethnomusicology but also 
on the wider areas of sociology and anthropology. It claims to eschew value judgements about 
high and low art, a big advantage in an educational landscape where everyone – heads of 
faculties as well as research grant committees – is anxious not to be seen to be reinforcing old 
value systems and hierarchies.  
It’s hard not to imagine, when the time comes to allocate scarce research funds for 
musicology, that projects based on a 'relational musicology' stance would not sweep all before 
 
41 Julie Thompson Klein, Creating Interdisciplinary Culture: A Model for Strength and Sustainability (San 
Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2010), p. 153, quoted in Jerry A. Jacobs, In Defense of Disciplines (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2016), p. 2 
42 In, for example, Paul Forman, "On the Historical Forms of Knowledge Production and Curation: Modernity 
entailed Disciplinarity, Postmodernity Entails Antidisciplinarity," in Osiris 27 (2012), pp. 56-97. 
43 Robert Frodeman, Julie Thompson Klein, and Carl Mitchem, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Interdisciplinarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. xxxv. The slyly pejorative word 'comfort' 
encourages the view that adhering to a discipline is a moral as much as an intellectual failing. For a more 
balanced view of expertise, see Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise: The Campaign Against Established 
Knowledge and Why it Matters (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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them. And if that happens, would relational musicology not become a discipline of its own, in 
institutional terms?  As Jerry Jacobs remarks, 'rather than reverse (sic) the long trend towards 
ever greater specialization, the creation of the latest round of new fields only hastens its 
advance.'44 It would surely not be long before relational musicology acquired precisely those 
institutional markers that devotees of interdisciplinarity insist should be relegated to history; 
scholarly associations, peer-reviewed journals, conferences, graduate courses. And with these 
would come claims on institutional funds.  
To declare that the old dispensation of long-established disciplines had a political 
dimension is reasonable enough. What is not reasonable is to imply that politics is the only 
thing that has kept and continues to keep the disciplines in business. At the institutional level, 
the disciplinary model continues to prove its worth, as is shown by the tendency of 
interdisciplinary studies to replicate the institutional structures of disciplines. As Jacobs 
reminds us, 'communities of like-minded researchers develop norms regarding evidence and 
interpretation, values regarding the importance of problems to be solved and issues to be 
addressed, hierarchies of reputation and reward – in short, disciplinary-like systems of social 
control. Either interdisciplinarity recreates similar communities…or chaos ensues; no 
community, no rules, no boundaries, no differentiating good from bad, typos from intended 
spellings, enduring insights from implausible suggestions.' 45 
It can be further argued that the continuing success of traditional disciplines rests on a 
firm epistemological principle, namely that conceptual stability is the sine qua non of 
knowledge growth. Stanley Fish’s 1989 essay 'Being Interdisciplinary is so very hard to do' 
may no longer be widely read, but it has lost none of its force. His argument is that 
interdisciplinarity offers the illusion of intellectual freedom, but in fact merely replicates the 
irksome confinement of the old disciplines, while offering none of their compensating 
advantages of conceptual stability. 'The interdisciplinary impulse finally does not liberate us 
from the narrow confines of academic ghettos to something more capacious; it merely 
redomiciles us in enclosures that do not advertise themselves as such.'46 
8. Conclusion  
The new enclosures so generously offered to musicology by the cognitive scientists and the 
sociologists and the anthropologists do indeed seem capacious, when compared to the musty 
confined 'ghetto' the discipline used to live in. But however diligently we explore these new 
territories, however many interesting incidental discoveries are made there, however far we 
pursue those ever-receding horizons, the possibility remains that one particular conceptual 
illumination – the most important one, surely, for any discipline calling itself 'musicology' – 
will remain forever out of reach. A genuinely new conception of what 'the musical' consists of 
will never be forthcoming, because such a thing requires at the outset a commitment both to a 
particular value system as enshrined in a particular musical tradition (a commitment which can 
widened and surmounted, but never repudiated), and a love of the musical acts and occasions 
to which that tradition gives rise.  
 
44 Jacobs, op. cit., p. 136. 
45 Ibid., p. 146. 
46 Stanley Fish, "Being Interdisciplinary Is So Very Hard To Do," in Profession (1989), pp. 15-22. 
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Such a commitment would need to be tempered constantly by an awareness that the chosen 
musical tradition is a creation of historical contingencies, and that not all of its values will seem 
valuable from our standpoint. 'Reflective commitment,' making use where necessary of 
theoretical approaches is the ideal—a difficult task to be sure, but it will seem impossible only 
to those who prefer the easier and less personally risky course of keeping their distance from 
the tradition in question, by applying some form of catch-all empirical investigative method. 
Applying a cordon sanitaire around the subject-matter in this way is actually an evasion, and—
to repeat—the work of musicology only begins with a commitment, an exertion of imaginative 
Einfühlung (feeling with) as originally described by Herder47, and embodied in more recent 
times in the interpretative discipline we call hermeneutics.    
It is this critical/interpretative stance, practised alongside the acquiring of embodied knowledge 
by engaging with musical practices, that musicology needs to cling to. Without one or other of 
those approaches, or both, musicology will become a never-ending anxious search, pursued 
everywhere except the place where the desired thing might be found, perpetuated by an 
endlessly prolonged deferral of the personal engagement without which that thing can never 
become real.  
This is not to assert that musicology could or even should return to a golden age before the 
practice and ethnomusicological 'turns,' a golden age which surely never existed. The 
investigation of music through the lens of other disciplines such as ethnography has already 
yielded a wealth of new insights. Musicology cannot stand aside from demands that curricula 
be decolonised, and in any case the globalised nature of musical production and experience 
requires an approach that is as pluralistic as the subject-matter has itself become in recent 
decades. But to admit all this does not in any way commit one to the further step, of denying 
the importance of that part of the musical occasion that is sung, or played on instruments, and 
which meets the ear. Laudan Nooshin warns against a 'fetishist focus on music as sound'48 but 
it is surely an equally grave sin to discount sound completely – because after all the sound of 
music is never merely sound, it is takes on formal and expressive qualities in the lives and ears 
and minds of those who make and witness it. It follows that an engagement with those sounds 
is essential, if music is to retain its ability to 'answer back' to the hypotheses of the 
ethnographer, the sociologist, the cognitive scientist or whomever.  
The question then becomes: which or whose materials? I would say that it should be the aim 
of musicological departments to aspire to a condition of being musically polyglot, or at least 
bilingual.  Students should be required to engage, in both a practical and critical way, with the 
musical materials of at least two widely contrasted traditions. This would inculcate a dual form 
of knowledge of each tradition, which is both engaged and embodied, and critical and distant. 
If the discipline embraced this aim it would, over time, lend a coherence to university 
departments and curricula which—in the no doubt laudable pursuit of methodological and 
 
47 Most explicitly in "This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity," in J.G. Herder: 
Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 
272-358 
48 Laudan Nooshin,"Happy Families? Convergence, Antagonism and Disciplinary Identities or "We’re all God 
knows what now" (Cook 2016)." Paper presented at the City Debate, 'Are we all Ethnomusicologists now?', City 
University London, June 1, 2016. 
http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/14817/1/Laudan%20Nooshin.%20Happy%20Families%3F%20Convergen
ce%2C%20Antagonism%20and%20Disciplinary%20Identities.%20City%20Debate.%201.6.16%20.pdf, 
accessed  September 30, 2019. 
17 
 
cultural diversity—are threatening to become debilitatingly fragmented, rather than 
invigoratingly plural. Only through this many-layered comparative engagement with music’s 
materials, undertaken alongside approaches drawn from other disciplines, can musicology 
engage in a dialogue of equals with those disciplines rather than being simply swallowed by 
them.  
 
 
